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What does it mean to knowingly distribute a certain quantity of drugs, in the furtherance of a
conspiracy? This question has been answered differently, in various circuits. The Sixth Circuit has
attempted to answer this question, in the 2016 case United States v. Gibson.  In 2016, Ray Gibson  led
an appeal, after receiving a mandatory minimum of 10 years. He pleaded guilty, in conspiring to
distribute  fty grams or more of methamphetamine.  Mr. Gibson was convicted under both 28 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and 28 U.S.C. § 846.  28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) states it is “unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to …distribute… a controlled substance” and this speci c section of the statute
states, the mandatory minimum sentence for anyone distributing 50 grams or more of a controlled
substance is 10 years.
Mr. Gibson was also convicted under the 21 U.S.C. § 846 the federal conspiracy law which states, “Any
person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense de ned in this title shall be subject to the
same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the common of which was the object of the attempt
of conspiracy.”  This means that an individual is subjected to the same sentence and sanctions as a
person who violates any provision under this title, which includes § 841. Thus, Mr. Gibson as a co-
conspirator was subject to be sentenced in accordance to § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), which is why he was
sentenced to do 10 years.
Mr. Gibson, in his appeal stated that he should not have been sentenced for 10 years because he could
not reasonably foresee that the conspiracy involved 50 or more grams of meth.  The court found the he
did not need to foresee a conspiracy, to distribute drugs that would involve a speci c drug quantity.
The court relied on United States v. Pruitt and United States v. Robinson.
In Robinson, the issue arose whether the defendant had the knowledge that he was selling a certain
quantity or if he had direct involvement with selling a certain quantity of the drug.  The defense counsel
argued that knowledge was required, however the district and appellate court disagreed and stated that
the jury should only determine the amount and the quantity involved in the conspiracy.  Thus, the
defendant anticipated in the amount that he could reasonably foresee.  The court in Robinson found
that the decision is different from Pruitt because Pruitt dealt with “whether a conspiracy compromising
multiple transactions was a single violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).”  However, Robinson and Gibson
both deal with the liability that one faces as a co-conspirator. The court in Robinson continued to assert
that as long as the defendant was involved in the conspiracy, it only mattered if it was a speci c
quantity, not the amount that a defendant could have reasonably foresaw.
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The court further explains there is no further mens rea requirement, and that a defendant must
reasonably foresee the drug quantity, in order to be liable for conspiracy.  The defendant argues that
the Supreme Court in Alleyne v. United States created a separate element pertaining to the drug quantity
that was rejected by the Sixth Circuit.  The Sixth Circuit  rst rejected an argument in United States v.
Dado which found that Alleyne did not add a new mens rea requirement to § 841(b).  The Sixth Circuit
also rejected the defendant’s argument that under United States v. Swiney, there is a mens rea
requirement that he reasonably foresaw the quantity of the drug.
In United States v. Swiney, the Government argued that all defendants should have received the same
statutory minimum of twenty years, because the heroin led to the death of an individual.  The Swiney
court, analyzes the decision, by using the sentencing guideline in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), which used
the element of foreseeability to determine if all defendants would have reasonably foreseen that
someone would have died, due to the heroin.  The Court in Swiney embraces the foreseeability
requirement, while noting that various other jurisdictions also embrace the foreseeability element.
In Gibson, instead of embracing the decision in Swiney which follows the logic of most of the other
circuits, the Court decided to follow Robinson despite juxtaposing the rest of the circuits. By the Sixth
Circuit rejecting the logic of Swiney, this made the Sixth Circuit an outlier nationwide, when it comes to
this topic of law. In the last paragraph of the 2016 Gibson decision, the court acknowledges the
unfairness of the decision because the application does not “serve the drug statute’s underlying purpose
of severely punishing larger-amount drug dealers.”  The court notes, absent of a change in the law from
the en banc court, the Supreme Court and Congress, the court was bound by precedents.  The Sixth
Circuit had an opportunity to change the precedent when en banc review was granted in October, 2017.
The en banc court was evenly divided on the issue, which led to the 10-year sentence remaining
undisturbed.
The issue of whether a defendant must have reasonably foreseen the speci c quantity of the conspiracy
has been debated in various circuit courts. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Foster dealt with three
defendants who were found guilty of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of crack in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846.  The defendant’s appealed the district court’s decision and argued that the “jury must
determine the quantity that was in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to each
defendant, as opposed to the conspiracy as a whole.”
In a previous case, of the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Collins, the court concluded that a defendant
involved in a conspiracy should not be subjected to the same punishment as everyone under §841, but
the sentencing should be individualized penalizing the defendant for the amount that is “attributable to
him.”  The Fourth Circuit grounds its decision in Pinkerton v. United States and the principles state that
the jury must examine the amount attributable, by each co-conspirator.
The First Circuit also  nds that a defendant must have reasonably foreseen the amount involved in the
conspiracy, in order to be held liable in the decision of Alleyne v. United States.  It is unfair for an
individual who was not involved in the whole conspiracy and another who was only involved in
distributing certain portions of the drug quantity, to be punished so extensively and harshly. The purpose
of punishing a person in accordance to § 846 and § 841 is to punish high level drug dealers, and not
punish the small dealers who happen to be involved in a larger conspiracy. By punishing all of the
individuals equally, juxtaposes the idea of a fair sentence for every defendant.
The First and Fourth Circuit is a large part of the circuits, which state in order for someone to be
punished under § 841, the quantity must be embraced by the drug conspiracy and be reasonably
foreseen by the defendant.  The Sixth Circuit should adopt this logic and the element of foreseeability
that has been adopted by every other circuit, and reject the reasoning of Robinson. The Sixth Circuit
needs to reevaluate the foreseeability element of drug conspiracy for fair and just sentencing to be given
to co-conspirators.
J.D. expected in 2019.
 United States v. Gibson, No. 15-6122, 2016 WL 6839156, (6th Cir. 2016), aff’d en banc 874 F.3d 544
(6th Cir. 2017).
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